Contrary to what some people think, the origins of violence against workers in Natal did not start with Cosatu president Elijah Barayi's attack on Inkatha leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi at the federation's launching rally in December 1985. Since its formation in the seventies, Inkatha had already demonstrated intolerance towards those who were not Inkatha followers.
Individuals who broke ranks with the organisation were particularly vulnerable. Former Inkatha general secretary Sibusiso Bhengu fled South Africa after threats to his life. Less prominent individuals had to flee, were beaten up or threatened.
Early relationship
The emerging Natal unions of the late seventies did not necessarily see themselves as being in opposition to Inkatha. Their concerns were more immediate - improving the conditions of their members on the shopfloor and building strong organisation. Inkatha portrayed itself as a cultural movement and wished to be regarded as an ally of the union movement. Buthelezi was often invited to address union gatherings. When Fosatu was launched in northern Natal in 1980, he was a guest speaker. He had harboured hopes of co-opting the union movement as a support base. Inkatha even offered to monitor the implementation of codes of conduct for foreign multinationals operating in South Africa, especially those relating to worker rights. Barney Dladla, an Inkatha official later dismissed by Buthelezi, was regarded as sympathetic to the union movement. He had also served on Tuacc, one of the forerunners to Fosatu. But as unions began to participate in growing militant opposition to apartheid, the relationship began to sour.
In the early eighties, communities resisting rent and transport increases and incorporation into the KwaZulu bantustan found themselves in conflict with Inkatha.
As the democratic forces became bigger, more organised, more vociferous in their opposition to apartheid and more of a challenge to Inkatha's position, confrontation was inevitable.
Violence as intolerance
Violence as an expression of Inkatha's intolerance dates back to the early 1980s. An Inkatha impi acting in concert with police beat up boycotting KwaMashu high school students. In 1983, five students were killed and a number injured at Zululand University after an Inkatha attack prompted by students' refusal to allow Buthelezi to speak on their campus.
The launch of the UDF also incurred Inkatha's wrath. It was now confronting a political challenge on what it regarded as its own turf. Inkatha felt particularly threatened by the UDF's uncompromising commitment to mass action. In contrast, Inkatha's talk of action in defence of popular struggles came to naught.
At its launch, Cosatu clearly allied itself with the congress tradition. There were no illusions that Inkatha could find favour with the new federation. Barayi's speech put a final nail in the coffin, declaring Buthelezi and other homeland leaders puppets of apartheid. Following the speech, Cosatu spent months defending its president's remarks and explaining its positions, even among its own rank and file. In the affiliates, most workers took a political position that saw Inkatha as part of the other side.
The year after Cosatu's formation, Inkatha launched Uwusa. This was an attempt to counter Cosatu's growing influence among workers. Inkatha still desired a base amongst workers. If it could not achieve this with Cosatu, then it would create one.
Uwusa's launch forced workers to make a conscious political choice. In some cases, Cosatu's more overt political stance attracted members.
The effects of the violence on worker organisation varied from area to area. In some workplaces, division between workers made meetings impossible. In their communities, workers were most vulnerable to political intimidation from Inkatha. Despite this, Cosatu didn't lose many members during this period. This was largely due to the effective shopfloor work of the unions, improving the quality of working life and job security, negotiating wage increases, and defending workers from unfair dismissal. This ensured a loyalty which kept worker organisation alive during this period.
In the late eighties, the character of leadership in some unions became more youthful and politicised, thrown up by siege situation that Cosatu members found themselves in. On the other hand, those that avoided an overt anti-Inkatha stance retained their character.
New conflict
Violence against the union movement in Natal went through different stages. One of the first flashpoints was in Pietermaritzburg. In May 1985, BTR Sarmcol dismissed 900 Mawu members after a strike to demand recognition at the company's Howick rubber plant. Buthelezi called on Inkatha members to resist a one-day stayaway and consumer boycott called in protest. The stayaway was a resounding success for the unions and the democratic movement. But ongoing confrontation followed and, in December 1986, two senior leaders of the BTR Sarmcol strike were adbucted and murdered.
What started out as sporadic and isolated incidents became a systematic, organised campaign of violence and intimidation throughout the region, including urban and rural areas. A pattern of Inkatha attacks emerged in reaction to major gatherings or events organised by Cosatu or the UDF. Buses transporting people to or from these events were frequently attacked by impis.
Another trend was Inkatha's forced recruitment campaigns. An example was on 2 August 1985, when crowds of sticking-wielding Inkatha vigilantes began to patrol the streets of Umlazi and KwaMashu. SADF hippos were seen following a short distance behind the group. Shouting "Usuthu", they went from door to door calling on all men and boys to take up sticks and join them. Those who refused were beaten up.
Resistance to Inkatha met with assassination and the looting and torching of homes. While initially individual activists were the targets, this began to affect entire communities fighting Inkatha's reign of terror. Tens of thousands of refugees were forced to flee their homes.
Security force collaboration with Inkatha took the form of openly assisting the impis, not intervening or responding to residents' pleas for protection, not investigating reported crimes such as arson and murder and detaining key Cosatu, UDF and other activists. By late 1987, 170 people had been killed in the violence and 280 UDF and Cosatu members were in detention.
Defending the people
In an attempt to implement a coherent peace process, a Cosatu-UDF Joint Working Committee was set up in 1987. This both placed the discipline and maturity of workers at the helm of a response and helped channel the militancy of the youth.
Two strategies emerged to deal with the violence. The one was a strategy of peace talks, the other a disciplined defence of the people. Both strategies developed from the conditions facing the affected communities.
The peace talks demonstrated the irresponsible, unreasonable nature of the other side. A complaints adjudication board, headed by a retired judge, was set up to hear complaints. However, this move was thwarted when Inkatha refused to accept a ruling in favour of Cosatu. Cosatu finally pulled out of the board. But the peace talks on their own were obviously inadequate to deal with the reality of those who bore the brunt of the violence. As activists put it: what do you do at midnight when someone stands at your door with a panga? No amount of interdicts and public exposure help you in that situation. It's your skin on the line. You run or you fight.
This was the basis for the other strategy, which was what unionists, shopstewards, youth and everyone who was involved in the areas affected by violence wanted, to defend themselves and their communities.
The Peace Accord
By 1990 the violence had intensified and had reached the Witwatersrand and parts of the Eastern Transvaal such as Wesselton, Ermelo, where the Inkatha-linked Black Cat gang was conducting a reign of terror against local organisations. The failure of the Pietermaritzburg peace initiatives prompted Cosatu to re-assess its position. The ANC had been unbanned. In many areas, "no-go zones" had been created, hampering the re-establishment of the organisation.
The balance of forces compelled the ANC and Cosatu to become involved in negotiations. The tripartite alliance joined a church and business-led peace initiative. After a long process of negotiations, the National Peace Accord (NPA) was eventually signed in September 1991.
The accord included a code of conduct for political organisations and the security forces; and agreement on a range of enforcement mechanisms to curb political violence and to uphold the accord. Its signatories were all the major political parties, including those in the bantustans and Cosatu. This was seen as a breakthrough, despite its weaknesses - the agreement was subject to existing laws, rules and procedures of the apartheid state, resources had to be provided from the state's constrained budget, continuous pressure was required to ensure its implementation, and the government - a party to the conflict - exercised veto powers over appointments to the Goldstone Commission and the Police Board. As president, FW de Klerk could decide which of the Commission's findings to turn over to the National Peace Committee. The agreement also failed to provide clear guidlines on mass action, private militias, and cultural weapons.
There is no doubt that, despite the shortcomings of the Accord, it helped to create a climate in which political negotiations could continue, elections could be held, and the transfer of power from the National Party to the Government of National Unity commenced. That violence and intimidation continues to be directed against the people in some areas of KwaZulu/Natal is not a failing on the part of the Peace Accord. It was not designed to reconcile implacably opposing political forces. The peace that still eludes the people of that region can only be secured once its future as an integral part of South Africa is assured. b
This article is sourced from an interview with Jayendra Naidoo, former Cosatu negotiations coordinator, member of the JWC in Natal, and coordinator of the alliance delegation in NPA negotiations.