Volume 9, No.3 - September 2000

Secretariat Report

Three years hard work for the workers

COSATU's Secretariat report to Congress

COSATU has done so much since its last National Congress in 1997 and even since the special Congress in 1999, that the Secretariat Report to the 7th National Congress is inevitably very long. It covers the political background, problems with the tripartite alliance, COSATU's work with other organisations and the activities and campaigns of COSATU and its affiliates. We only have room here for just a summary of a few of its sections.

Political background to the Congress

The last three years saw intense contestation between the democratic forces and the forces of reaction - a period of class contestation around the direction and course of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR).

As the national question is being addressed, class is increasingly becoming the principal contradiction in South Africa.

In the final analysis, understanding the nature of oppression is only possible if it is analysed in class terms. By itself, racial prejudice does not entirely explain the basis and logic of oppression premised on a capitalist form of accumulation in a colonial setting.

The workers continued to score important victories after the Sixth National Congress. The labour laws piloted by the democratic movement reshaped the apartheid labour market. On the social front, workers and their families benefited from improved public services. Millions of people who historically had no water, electricity or schools now have access to them. This has enormous social and economic benefits for individuals and their communities. But still, in economic and social terms, the legacy of apartheid remains entrenched.

The structure of capital has not been fundamentally changed. To this day, Anglo-American controls over half of the assets on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, while four banks own most of the financial sector.

Black economic empowerment has failed to dent South Africa's highly concentrated ownership to create new centres of economic power. Instead, it has been limited to advancing a minority of well-connected black individuals, who rely heavily on white capital.

The loss of hundreds of thousands of jobs in mining, agriculture, manufacturing and the public sector has combined with an increase in high-level opportunities for blacks and women with the necessary competencies and skills.

Class stratification appears in increasingly deep but less racially distinct inequalities in income and wealth. The difference between average black and white incomes, though still large, is decreasing steadily, while the gap between rich and poor in the black community and overall has widened. Poverty and unemployment are concentrated among Africans, women and the young, and in the rural areas.

The NDR must address these inequalities through various strategies to redistribute wealth. It is not about enfranchising a new elite that uses its access to economic and political power to entrench its class interest as the national interest. To alter South African society radically requires a massive transfer of wealth from the white minority and the creation of new sites of economic activity.

The adoption of conservative economic policies in 1996, including stringent fiscal and monetary policies and tariff liberalisation, was a major setback. The Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy has failed to achieve its basic aims of growth, redistribution and employment.

Comparing its targets with actual outcomes since 1997 suggests that government went even farther than GEAR demanded in cutting deficits and tariffs. Meanwhile, growth was substantially lower than predicted, interest rates were higher and the increase in private investment much lower.

Where GEAR predicted substantial increases in formal employment, on average over 100 000 jobs have disappeared every year since it was adopted. Many gains scored since 1994 are now under pressure.

Politically, the adoption of GEAR marked a turn to the centre-right. It has increasingly set the budget deficit as the primary objective, displacing the broader social goals of the NDR. It signalled a shift from the state-led approach underpinning the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to a market-oriented strategy.

For COSATU the NDR is far from over. The 1994 breakthrough was a qualitative shift in the struggle, but it was by no means its end-point. It placed the ANC in power, not as an end in itself, but as a means to use state power to address all three forms of oppression.

The NDR represents the most direct route to socialism.For COSATU and the SACP, socialism is not just a vision or an ideal located in some distant future that we can only dream about. Within the current situation, we must build the momentum towards socialism.


How well is the Tripartite Alliance working?

The Tripartite Alliance between the ANC, COSATU and the SACP collectively represents the overwhelming majority of the South African population. It is an alliance with a history of struggle and rooted in the people.

Prior to the 1994 elections, the Alliance adopted the RDP as a strategy for transforming South African society. It had wide support, particularly from within the democratic fold. Business and the former ruling party grudgingly accepted it in public, but generally worked to undermine it.

The ascendance of the ANC to power meant a qualitative shift in the operations of the Alliance. Whereas under apartheid, the partners struggled together and worked closely, under the current conditions the Alliance has failed to give expression to this close working relationship.

Apart from deploying cadres to strengthen Parliament and the Executive at all levels of government, we have not clarified how the Alliance relates to government. In theory, the entire Alliance should be in power, but in practice it does not control what actually happens.

In the new conditions, the Alliance has failed to function effectively or develop a strategy to implement the RDP or the manifesto. This vacuum has resulted in policy largely being driven by bureaucrats and technocrats with the support of big business, and not by mass organisations including the ANC.

By no stretch of the imagination can the Alliance be described as fully in control of state policy and power. The loss of the strategic initiative has led to demobilisation and demoralisation of the masses, and the politics of self-enrichment and confusion.

When confronted by difficult questions, the Alliance has tended to focus on issues where there is agreement and skirt around problem areas. As a result, it has papered over cracks around serious disagreements, especially on economic policy. Only during elections are there cohesion and regular meetings.

The Alliance summits serve a symbolic role, and agreements reached in these summits do not find expression in government programmes. This situation is compounded by rumour mongering, a tendency to question each other's bona fides; and a loss of faith in the ability of the Alliance to ensure government policy adheres to agreements.

In the last three years a number of Alliance summits were convened and adopted far-reaching political, organisational and economic resolutions. The summit held from 31 August to 1 September 1997, adopted clear resolutions around public sector restructuring, the re-alignment of government policy toward employment creation, and the need for a developmental macro-economic policy.

These decisions were reaffirmed in the Alliance summit in October 1998, which explicitly stated that no macro-economic policy is set in stone and that priority should be accorded to addressing the social deficit. This summit created hopes of a new post-GEAR consensus.

In 1999, no summit was held and one was unceremoniously cancelled. Disappointingly no summit has yet been convened in 2000. While this report was being finalised, a ten-a-side meeting was postponed by the ANC.

In all these engagements with the Alliance, COSATU submitted substantive proposals and task teams were established. In practice, these task teams did not deliver on their mandates. The agreements reached have had no substantive impact on government programmes.

These circumstances led to the argument in COSATU's Congress discussion document that the relationship between the Alliance and government is "dangerously undefined." Government takes decisions without effective Alliance participation.

Comrades in government expect the Alliance partners to understand and support these decisions without any prior agreement. This reduces the Alliance to a rubber stamp, a source of many tensions within the Alliance.

The political discussion document adopted by COSATU in 1997 argued that the Alliance should develop a programme that can present a "hegemonic alternative" to lead society and a social movement for transformation. In the absence of this kind of programme, there is no clear power base for government to resist pressure from local and international capital.

Regrettably some in government have expressed great reservations about this COSATU approach. They like the Alliance, but in their view demanding a programme to drive the transformation project jointly takes matters too far. They see this as a demand for dual power and co-determination, which they oppose.

The Alliance is confronted by a stark choice. Either there must be a qualitative shift in its operations, which involves it in meaningful participation in policy formulation, or it risks collapse. The latter route cannot be contemplated.

But to avoid it, the Alliance must begin to operate in a different style and on the basis of a commonly agreed programme.

It cannot be held together by historic sentiment alone. In sum, we have a historic duty to fight to save the Alliance from extinction.


The role of COSATU

Motive force for revolution

Particularly in the wake of the 1999 public service strike, the trade union movement was accused of representing sectarian interests that threaten ill-defined national interests. It is said that because workers have jobs, they form a privileged group or an elite. Workers' demands for a living wage and fair working conditions are projected as a stumbling bloc to employment creation.

A variant of this argument holds that COSATU and its affiliates are "economistic" or "workerist" in outlook, and need to get a grip since there is more to life than collective bargaining. Increasingly we see the abuse of Marxist rhetoric to mask a neo-liberal agenda that is defined as the national interest. This is tantamount to delivering the working class on a silver platter to the bourgeoisie.

These arguments are devoid of any substance and deflect attention from the real issues.

To call workers a labour aristocracy moves attention from the real privileged class in our society. The top 10% of households in South Africa control over 40% of the national income and a far higher share of the national wealth.

In contrast, the next 40% of households - which includes virtually all of organised labour - receive only its proportional share of income, which is around 40%. Most workers fall into the category of working poor. Nonetheless, they effectively form the main social security net for millions of the unemployed and underemployed.

Attacking the organised working class and attempting to limit its power and influence denies the NDR of its central important motive force. Marx and Engels saw the working class as the driver of change, not because it was the most oppressed and poor, but because of its strategic position in large-scale production, which supported strong, progressive organisation.

Even now, the organised working class provides a critical basis for maintaining the power of the Alliance in all areas of society, including through the elections.

Attacks on organised labour are neither surprising nor coincidental. Organised labour and business represent the power centres of civil society. These two forces can muster real power to achieve their aims.

When labour wields its power, it directly challenges other groups who have power - mostly government and business. Naturally those with power both within and outside government are wary of other sources of power. They cannot easily disregard the organised working class the way they can ignore most of the rest of civil society.

When COSATU flexes its muscles, it has no intention of undermining the government or weakening it politically. In fact in most cases our campaign should strengthen government's hand, not weaken it.

This does not mean that COSATU is not confronted by dilemmas. In particular, when public sector unions confront the democratic state as an employer, this can pit them against the state, which in turn attacks them as representing sectarian and selfish interests.

It invokes progressive language and arguments to support this claim, even when it expresses sentiments like those of any shortsighted employer. Yet representing workers' interests is not inimical to real transformation, which must meet the needs of the working class.

Part of the process to transform the state is to ensure that it becomes a model employer in its labour relations. COSATU public sector unions are distinguished by their understanding of the twin task of transforming the state and representing their constituency.

As underscored by the public sector affiliates' Service Delivery Conference in February this year, as well as a host of agreements relating to transformation and work re-organisation, they have consistently sought to transform service delivery while defending their workers' conditions.

But this function depends on the ability to support a public service ethos and adequate resources. No matter how committed a nurse is to provide services, without the requisite resources that commitment will be frustrated.

The claim that organised labour is too narrowly focused is also refuted by our links to civil society. COSATU has consciously and consistently retained links with other progressive organisations, for example through the jobs and poverty campaign, the alternative budget process and coalitions to work with parliament around specific matters.

Social Dialogue and Engagement Forums

The National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) is a key forum of engagement, with considerable powers defined in its founding legislation. Its Chambers, particularly those on the Labour Market and Development, play a pivotal role in processing and negotiating policies and legislation.

Between 1997 and 2000, the Labour Market Chamber completed negotiations on the BCEA, the Employment Equity Act and the Skills Development Act. It has also concluded agreements on Codes of Good Practice, including the Code on Sexual Harassment.

The government's stance of avoiding broader debate on economic and especially fiscal policy has largely sidelined the Public Finance and Industry Chambers. In particular, the Department of Finance wants to convert the Public Finance Chamber into an information-sharing forum, rather than engaging substantively on key policies.

NEDLAC's role has recently come under renewed pressure. First, starting with negotiations over the BCEA in 1997, some government officials have conveniently argued that it usurps Parliamentary powers. This tactic has largely failed. Second, elements in government are wary of NEDLAC's legal powers, prefering to establish less formal forums where they have greater control.

Presidential Trade Union Working Group

For this reason, initially there were concerns that the Presidential Trade Union Working Group could displace NEDLAC.

This problem has been addressed by the clarification that the working group will provide space for open dialogue between the President and labour, but leave formal agreements to NEDLAC.

Another concern is that tripartite forums should not become talk-shops but meaningful grounds for engagement, with visible impact on the lives of the people. We must continuously assess their performance to achieve these ends.

The failure of the Alliance to function effectively means that we are unable to develop a common approach on how NEDLAC, the Presidential working groups and the Millennium Labour Council (see below) can be utilised to deepen transformation or to ensure buy-in to our programmes for change by capital and other social forces.

Engagement with Ministers and Parliament

COSATU also engages directly with government policy-making and monitoring at all levels - from national ministers to provincial MECs, departmental processes and local government.

We engage with Parliament through systematic interaction with ten portfolio committees. A problem arises because of the diffuse nature of many government policy processes and the lack of defined structures for monitoring implementation. Too often Parliament is presented with fait accomplis, which prevent real debates and make it difficult to exercise its oversight role.

Some parts of the Executive seem to expect Parliament simply to rubber stamp their decisions. Still, in some instances Parliamentary committees adopt independent positions, forcing departments to revise policies and legislation.


The Millennium Labour Council

On 7 July 2000, the Millennium Labour Council (MLC) was launched. This was a culmination of a long period of debate within COSATU about the dangers and benefits of formalising bilateral relations with capital.

The idea was born out of a 1999 study trip to the Netherlands and Ireland by representatives of business and labour. A record of understanding between labour and business identifies unemployment and job creation, poverty and inequality as the key priorities.

Possible dangers include the possibility that the MLC will undermine NEDLAC or lock us into an arrangement detrimental to workers. These concerns have been addressed through the agreement that the MLC will not replace NEDLAC.

The 1999 Elections and the Local Government Elections

The second democratic election in June 1999 gave the ANC an overwhelming mandate to continue with social transformation. The massive electoral victory opened the space for implementation of a far-reaching transformation programme.

Armed with an almost two-thirds majority, intense popularity among the electorate and international support for the struggles against apartheid, the ANC-led government has considerable power to counterpoise to the opponents of the NDR.

Factors behind the ANC victory include its popularity amongst a large section of the population, the sterling work by the entire Alliance to mobilise for the elections, and a fairly progressive manifesto that addressed people's basic concerns like unemployment and poverty.

The opposition parties collectively do not pose a serious threat to the ANC but will continue to try to undermine it. The real threat is capital, which has demonstrated its ability to pressurise government. In addition, failure to address people's basic concerns will seriously undermine the ANC's power base. The fact that large parts of the election manifesto have been ignored by government is therefore of grave concern. One key weakness identified by the Alliance after the 1999 elections was the developing gap between the leadership and their mass base.

The forthcoming local government elections provide an opportunity to reinforce the transformation process at the local level. The Special Congress adopted a resolution committing COSATU to support the ANC election campaign, premised on the belief that the ANC is the only party capable of transforming local government into non-racial and integrated sphere of government.

It also recognises that, despite serious capacity constraints, many ANC-controlled local governments have begun to provide services to their communities. For COSATU to be able to mobilise its members, however, it is important that the political and labour problems that have plagued local government, and notably iGoli 2002, should be resolved. The Alliance must agree beforehand on a vision and role for local government, with a commitment to provide the necessary resources.

Priority should also be given to addressing the backlogs inherited from apartheid and provision of services in an equitable manner. These commitments must be reflected in the elections manifesto, and a post-election process to implement the manifesto should be defined.

COSATU strengths and weaknesses

Strengths

COSATU has strength that many trade unions and organisations in the world can only dream about. Our power arises from our ability to mobilise members, as demonstrated in the 1999 election campaign, the Jobs and Poverty Campaign and the May Day 2000 rallies.

Despite the wave of retrenchments and job losses in recent years, COSATU has retained a high level of membership. This shows COSATU's appeal to workers across sectors and political inclinations.

We counteracted the potential loss of members both through a recruitment campaign and by gaining members in new areas, by breaking down racial barriers or gaining more affiliates. Most of our affiliates have made great strides in realising our principle of non-racialism.

In the Sixth National Congress we developed a comprehensive organisational policy. In November 1998, the CEC translated these resolutions into a three-year programme of action. identifying COSATU's role in the new millennium as:

The Special National Congress adopted resolutions on organisational renewal under the theme: Consolidation of COSATU for the New Millennium. COSATU has adapted to the current phase of our struggle without sacrificing the principles and traditions bequeathed by our forebears. We have sustained the militancy of our membership in these new conditions.

We still have a powerful shop steward movement that is highly politicised, with strong shop-floor organisation and a clear understanding of the role unions must play in South Africa's transformation.

On that basis, we have combined mass mobilisation with engagement at the policy level. In the process, we have debunked the condescending notion that ordinary workers cannot comprehend complex policy issues.

The number of COSATU affiliates has increased as new affiliates joined, while others have merged to former stronger unions. The former leadership of CWIU and PPWAWU should be congratulated for joining to create CEPPWAWU, with a membership of 73 720. The newly formed SATAWU, which results from a merger between T&GWU and SARHWU/SATAWU, should be hailed as a realisation of our long-term vision of "one industry - one union." This new union has over 100 000 members.

We have retained the organisational strength associated with our proud history. Our traditions are reflected in our commitment to worker control and our culture of democracy, open debate, healthy criticism, comradeship and willingness to sacrifice and rise above selfish personal interests. Despite weaknesses in some areas, COSATU structures at affiliate, regional and local level remain intact.

When the need has arisen, our leadership has been able to give direction in an accountable manner. The dynamic interaction and engagement between leaders and members support a leadership style not based on demigods, personality cults, careerism or disregard of members' interests.

Our leaders are true servants of our members and the working class as a whole. That does not mean no one in COSATU uses the organisation for selfish reasons. But on balance, they are a small minority.

It is not a miracle that our leadership culture is what it is today. It is a product of an active and strong organisation that keeps leaders accountable. COSATU continues to welcome a wide range of progressive ideologies and tendencies. Members from a range of political organisations have found their home in our ranks. This diverse membership is however fiercely protective of COSATU and acts in our structures as loyal and disciplined members.

The co-existence of ideologies and political perspectives creates a culture of robust debate. Intensive discussions have given rise to better-defined political strategies. COSATU has developed greater cohesion than at any other time in its history. The Executive acts together as a leadership that understands the challenges facing our movement and the country. Members of the Executive often make themselves available for the organisational and political work of the Federation, sometimes at the expense of their own affiliates.

The task of reporting back to Regional Shop Steward Councils on EXCO and CEC decisions is therefore not confined to the COSATU National Office Bearers.

Weaknesses

Despite these strengths, there are serious weaknesses in our organisation. The major shortcoming remains the uneven development of affiliates.

Many have the human and material resources they need to fulfil their functions, strengths that enable them to attract and retain skilled staff. Their resources mean they can train staff and leadership, and thus provide quality service to their members.

On the other hand, some are organisationally weak and lack resources. Weaknesses range from simply failing to fulfil tasks to internal tensions and divisions. Some of the reasons are beyond our control - for instance, where unions like SAAPAWU organise vulnerable workers with insecure jobs.

Too often, however, energy and resources are diverted away from addressing weaknesses into internal strife, backstabbing, destructive cliques and criticism. The weaker unions spend little or no financial resources on developing leadership, staff and strong shop stewards.

NEDCOM reports show that some unions do not budget for shop steward and leadership training. In addition, the internecine struggle for members through poaching causes conflict between COSATU affiliates.

In some cases, the gap between the grassroots and leadership at various levels is worrying. It appears in the growing gap between participation in COSATU constitutional structures by part-time and full-time office bearers. Elected full-time leaders dominate these structures, rather than elected worker office bearers.

True, worker leaders generally lack the time to prepare for and attend meetings. Nonetheless, the dominance of officials and full-time office bearers is cause for concern. It poses the danger of diminishing worker control.

Deteriorating service puts pressure on workers to find alternative sources of help. They may even cross the floor to more viable unions within or even outside COSATU, compounding the demarcation problems.

COSATU Organisation

Changes in Leadership

The national elections in 1999 brought about a substantial change in COSATU's national and provincial leadership. Four of the six National Office Bearers were elected to national or provincial government: President John Gomomo, First Vice President Connie September, Treasurer Ronald Mofokeng and General Secretary Mbhazima Shilowa.

In addition, from the regions, the secretaries from Wits, Free State/Northern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, the chairs from the Eastern and Western Cape and the vice chair of the Western Transvaal won seats in Parliament.

The Special National Congress on 18-20 August 1999 replaced the National Office Bearers with the following:

President Willie Madisha

First Vice President Peter Malepe

Second Vice President Joyce Pekane

Treasurer Alina Rantsolase

General Secretary Zwelinzima Vavi

Deputy General Secretary Tony Ehrenreich

Comrade Peter Malepe was later replaced by Joseph Nkosi, an NUM shop steward, National Education Committee chair and COSATU Mpumalanga regional chairperson. Regrettably, for family reasons Comrade Tony Ehrenreich decided not to avail himself for re-election at Congress. He has since been elected as the regional secretary in the Western Cape.

CEC and EXCO

The Central Executive Committee (CEC) and the Executive Committee (EXCO) improved their functioning in 1994-97. Both comprise representatives from all affiliates, but representation on the CEC is proportional to membership. The CEC is the policy structure and meets twice a year. EXCO meets every month except when either the CEC or another senior constitutional structure meets.

Discussions at the CEC and EXCO were generally lively, useful and well informed. In the past three years, neither committee had to postpone a meeting because of poor participation, although most started late.

Despite the good performance of both structures, it does not seem logical to keep the CEC in its current form. Because the CEC meets only twice a year, it is no longer feasible to refer urgent policy issues only to it.

As a result, EXCO, which was originally supposed to undertake administrative tasks and oversee negotiations forums, has ended up guiding policy issues and giving mandates to the National Office Bearers on administrative issues.

The only unique responsibilities left to the CEC are the adoption of budgets and audited statements and the creation of new staff positions. Even in these areas, the CEC often mandates EXCO.

Moreover, monthly EXCO meetings leave little time to implement decisions. This means that before the ink dries on the report and minutes of the previous EXCO, preparations for the next one must begin.

It therefore seems more efficient to eliminate EXCO and increase the frequency of CEC meetings. Each union would have two delegates to the CEC. Delegations would have vote weights largely according to membership. Thus, unions with more than 100 000 members should be entitled to four votes.

Membership

After substantial growth in 1991-'97, COSATU's membership remained virtually unchanged in the past three years. Given the large decline in formal employment, that was a massive achievement.

As the following table shows, continued growth in public service membership offset substantial declines in manufacturing and mining. Still, despite job losses, union density remains low in many areas, and not only in the difficult-to-organise sectors.

In future, recruitment must be strategic to maintain and expand our organisation.

Table 1.

Affiliates 1991 1994 1997 2000 % Cosatu members 2000
NUM 269 622 310 596 310 596 290 070 16%
NEHAWU 18 110 63 835 162 530 234 607 13%
SADTU n a 59 427 146 000 218 747 12%
NUMSA 273 241 169 598 220 00 200 000 11%
SACTWU 185 740 150 078 150 000 119 930 7%
SAMWU 60 304 100 406 116 524 119 930 7%
FAWU 129 480 121 435 139 810 119 302 7%
SATAWU n a n a n a 103 218 6%
SACCAWU 96 628 102 234 102 234 102 234 6%
CEPPWAWU n a n a   73 720 4%
POPCRU n a n a 44 999 70 618 4%
SASBO n a n a 70 377 63 046 3%
CWU n a n a 70 377 63 046 3%
SAAPAWU n a n a 29 000 22 163 1%
SASAWU n a n a n a 18 000 1%
SADNU n a n a n a 8 128 0%
RAPWU n a n a n a 3 500 0%
PAWE n a n a n a 2 571 0%
CAWU 30 123 25 461 31 606 n a n a
CWIU 45 147 41 462 45 000 n a n a
PPWAWU 42 962 36 630 49 422 n a n a
SADWU 16 462 25 149 n a n a n a
SAPSAWU n a n a 14 318 n a n a
SARHWU   36 243 35 398 37 150 n a
T&GWU 33 324 38 482 53 989 n a n a
SAFPU n a n a n a 400 0%
TOTAL 1 258 853 1 303 272 1 763 555 1 805 054 100%

Table 2

Affiliate % change, 1994-97 % change 1997-2000
POPCRU n a 60%
SADTU 146% 50%
NEHAWU 155% 44%
SATAWU 123% 13%
SAMWU 16% 3%
SACCAWU 0% 0%
NUMSA 30% -9%
SASBO n a -10%
CWU 73% -13%
FAWU 15% -15%
NUM 0% -19%
SACTWU 0% -20%
CEPPWAWU 21% -22%
SAAPAWU n a -24%
     
TOTAL 35% 2,4%

 


Interventions in Affiliates

The Sixth National Congress passed a resolution permitting COSATU to assist with internal problems in affiliates. On this basis, COSATU has taken constructive action, either at the affiliate's request or on its own initiative. The main interventions related to difficulties in FAWU, SAAPAWU, CAWU and SASBO.

COSATU's Constitution defines the relationship between affiliates and the Federation, and clearly permits interventions of this kind. Still, to ensure consistency and avoid unnecessary conflict, guidelines for interventions must be developed in line with the directive of the Sixth National Congress.

Demarcation

Poaching of members - that is, recruiting affiliates outside of a union's scope, as demarcated by COSATU - is a significant cause of conflict. It weakens the ability of unions to ensure coherent organisation within industries and enterprises.

The Sixth National Congress condemned the practice and decided that affiliates must transfer poached members to the appropriate union within six months. Unfortunately, despite extensions in the deadline, no affiliates reported that they resolved the problem. By the end of 1999, the National Office Bearers informed the CEC that since most affiliates were guilty of transgressions of policy, they were unable to recommend or take stern action. The matter is referred back to Congress for further direction.

Legal Actions Against Unions

The past two years have seen a substantial increase in legal claims against unions by employers, especially state-owned enterprises, and members. Some claims are so large that they could ruin the union. Some are a transparent effort to remove labour issues from their correct place in the CCMA and the Labour Court.

We must resist and condemn these attempts to use the law to bash unions. In addition, unions must take measures to minimise their legal risks.

Campaigns

The Jobs and Poverty Campaign

The Special National Congress decided to embark on a programme of mass action to highlight ongoing retrenchments and the unemployment crisis. COSATU had earlier served a Section 77 notice at NEDLAC on 31 July 1999. The notice had five key demands:

The Special National Congress decided that if the NEDLAC process did not bear fruit, rolling mass action at sectoral and provincial level would be initiated. When it became clear that the NEDLAC negotiations were not going anywhere, we embarked on an intense programme of mobilisation, demonstrations and regional stayaways, culminating in a general strike on 10 May 2000.

The campaign began with affiliates' activities in January, followed by regional weekly focuses, May Day celebrations and finally the national strike. The campaign was a resounding success, with approximately four million workers participating in the general strike. Workers came out in their thousands in cities and villages across South Africa. Doubts cast on COSATU's ability to mobilise its constituency were laid to rest.

The action received support from beyond the ranks of COSATU. A poll conducted by the Sunday Independent after the strike confirmed massive support. Mobilisation work by regions and affiliates contributed greatly to the success. Workers and communities supported the issues raised by the campaign and came out in their thousands for provincial and sectoral actions. They also showed strong support in the May Day celebrations.

The campaign also galvanised formations in the rest of civil society. In March, COSATU organised a civil society conference, which agreed to establish a committee made up of key community-based non-governmental organisations and COSATU.

Developments after the general strike

The single most important achievement of the campaign was to place the issue of job losses and unemployment at the centre of the national debate. It tilted the balance of forces in our favour and shook business out of its complacency. Initially, the campaign met with derision from opposition parties and some in government. Attempts from the ANC and business to avert the action came too late.

Finally, after many months of treating the issue lightly, business, or at least SACOB, met with our leadership. They agreed in principle to a CODESA-type discussion, under the auspices of NEDLAC, to address the unemployment crisis. COSATU had demanded this when we realised that the demands submitted to NEDLAC, while they would cushion the impact of job losses, were inadequate to address the unemployment crisis.

It became clear that a once-off action would not achieve the goals of employment creation. Against this background, the CEC Lekgotla in May decided to continue the campaign. Based on the outcome of the current discussions, Congress must discuss a longer-term programme

The Lekgotla decided that government and business must give concrete responses within eight weeks of the CEC meeting and that if no progress is registered, another Section 77 notice would be submitted to NEDLAC.

In the interim, the campaign would target companies planning to retrench workers, such as Transnet and Telkom, which threaten thousands of jobs. Affiliates were expected to submit information on companies threatening to throw workers on the streets. Subsequently, a meeting was convened by the NEDLAC Director for 1 June 2000. It was supposed to be a five-a-side meeting of senior representatives from business, labour and government. COSATU, the community organisations and business sent senior leaders, but the most senior government person was a Deputy-Director General of the Department of Labour. The National Office Bearers decided to stage a sit-in at NEDLAC.

This had the desired outcomes. For the first time since COSATU submitted its demands, there was discussion on their content. Generally, government has begun to treat the issue far more seriously. A breakthrough agreement was that the NEDLAC Executive would discuss key economic and social issues, so as to address poverty and unemployment. The fact that all NEDLAC constituencies committed themselves to negotiate national priorities demonstrates that the workers' campaign opened space for this critical debate.

This achievement was boosted by agreements reached in the President Trade Union Working Group meeting on 18 July 2000, when both government and labour acknowledged the gravity of the unemployment crisis and agreed that NEDLAC should be used as a forum to develop a way forward.

Negotiations on State-Owned Enterprise (SOE)

As part of the Job Crisis Campaign, COSATU made the following demands on the National Framework Agreement (NFA) for State-Owned Enterprise:

The NFA's six-a-side committee, which consists of Ministers and labour representatives, met on 19 June 2000. The meeting essentially agreed:

It became clear that:

An NFA process will look at alternatives by the end of September. It will permit labour to review management's business plans, which until now have been secret, and propose alternatives. As part of the agreement on Telkom, government will support a sector summit on telecommunications. This must be regarded as a significant victory for the campaign.

Restructuring the public sector

The public sector - the public service, state-owned enterprises and local government - effectively forms the implementation arm of the state. A strong developmental strategy and improved government services for working communities requires substantial restructuring.

But the public sector is also a major employer, accounting for over 20% of all formal employees. The process of transformation must thus take into account workers' needs.

COSATU has consistently taken the position that restructuring the public sector must be driven by social needs. Efforts to transform the state must start by defining its role in development. The restructuring process must involve consultation with all major stakeholders, including labour, to ensure that it truly addresses social needs and to minimise the costs of change.

In contrast to this approach, driven by budget cuts, in many state agencies a managerialist approach to restructuring has emerged. It seeks to minimise the state by demanding that public agencies eliminate every activity management defines as "non-core". As far as possible, the public sector should contract out its operations to the private sector.

This model of a "contracting state" limits the role of government to defining and paying for outputs from the private sector. This strengthens the ability of the private sector to influence government delivery.

But private investors will not make a profit from serving poor communities, which generally cannot afford to pay for services. In the long run, the contracting strategy undermines the social wage and efforts to equalise government services to overcome the legacy of apartheid.

Typically, the managerialist approach goes hand in hand with a demand that the public sector reduce personnel costs - which effectively means cutting jobs and/or pay. In the past six years, public service employment dropped by 170 000 - even as our people suffer from a lack of services. The loss of jobs has added significantly to the unemployment crisis.

State-owned enterprises

In 1999, government announced it would speed up the transformation of the four largest public corporations - Eskom, Telkom, Transnet and Denel. Its proposals, as formalised in the policy framework of the Department of Public Enterprises in August 2000, essentially aim at full or partial privatisation of the companies and their industries.

These policies seem likely to hinder service delivery to the poor, as well as fuelling large-scale retrenchment, especially of unskilled workers.

In July 2000, the jobs and poverty campaign succeeded in revitalising the NFA for state-owned enterprise. In August, CWU and COSATU used the NFA to halt, at least temporarily, planned retrenchments of up to 10 000 workers at Telkom.The NFA also provides a framework for engagement around Transnet and Eskom.

Public service

The public service poses unions with the challenge of defining appropriate transformation strategies, which may require some sacrifices from members, while opposing inappropriate proposals from management.

In 1999 government substantially changed its negotiations stance in the public service. Without any agreement with labour, it implemented a final offer on salaries which threw the negotiations system as a whole into crisis.

In 2000 it applied to withdraw from the agreement on service and skills audits, which aimed to ensure systematic restructuring of the public service under joint supervision by employer and labour.

Toward the end of 1999, COSATU began to play a stronger role in co-ordinating the public service affiliates. In February 2000, the Service Delivery Conference adopted labour and remuneration policies for the public service. These have guided negotiations and work toward the public service job summit.

In both 1999 and 2000, COSATU worked with the public service unions in discussions with the Alliance around wage negotiations and policy issues.

Local government

The national government has had to establish democratic, unified local systems. But it has also adopted a policy of reducing subsidies, on the grounds that local government should increasingly raise its own income. This has been devastating to the efforts of local governments to improve services, especially in poor regions.

Budget cuts have led to a push to privatise basic services, such as water and electricity. This had considerable influence on the iGoli 2002 plans for Johannesburg, which initially aimed to establish autonomous utilities to provide basic services.

Labour action has ensured that the utilities will remain within the state sector. Still, management's insistence on implementing the plans for iGoli 2002 without adequate consultation have led to considerable conflict and delays. COSATU has supported SAMWU in negotiations on iGoli 2002, especially in the Alliance.

HIV / AIDS

HIV / AIDS is a serious public health problem with socio-economic, employment and human rights implications. COSATU organises highly vulnerable workers, such as miners, transport and migrant workers in general. Moreover, COSATU's members in the public service, especially nurses, corrections officers, police and teachers, have a central role in caring for people with Aids.

The Special Congress adopted far-reaching resolutions on HIV / AIDS which seek to:

In November 1999, as a basis for negotiations and affiliates' policy development, the CEC endorsed a policy on HIV / AIDS in the workplace.

The policy deals with:

The Awareness Campaign

The 1999 Awareness Campaign aimed to de-stigmatise the disease and raise consciousness about HIV / AIDS. It was co-ordinated jointly with the affiliates' health and gender co-ordinators. A two-day workshop developed a workplace policy, a shop steward booklet, and an education programme.

Some 250 000 booklets were produced and circulated. Workshops were conducted in the regions and close to 10 000 s

hop stewards were trained. Shop stewards distributed educational material and condoms at workplaces and blitzed bus stops, stations and industrial areas. Joint action was held with the Department of Health on World Aids Day, 1 December.

In order to provide clear guidance on management of HIV / AIDS in the workplace, the Department of Labour published a Code of Good Practice. It makes it mandatory for all employers to develop workplace programmes, which reinforces COSATU's demands. At the time of writing, the code was subject to negotiations at NEDLAC.

Conclusion

The government's macro economic policy has failed to deliver on its promises of growth, employment and redistribution. Rising unemployment, high interest rates and cuts in the budget for social services and infrastructure threaten to reverse working class gains since 1994. We therefore reiterate our rejection of current fiscal, monetary and trade policies.

We reaffirm our demand that economic and social policies must take forward the NDR. Critical steps are fulfilment of the demands arising out of the jobs and poverty campaign for sector summits to generate an industrial policy, which would guide trade policies; increased investment in infrastructure and housing; and increased resourcing of government programmes.