Volume 6 No 4 - August / September 1997
At the conclusion of the 6th National Congress in September, workers and the country as a whole will except a clear vision from Cosatu at a political and socio-economic level. Our members will also be hoping that we have resolved to build an even stronger federation.
This is the challenge facing all delegates as they prepare for the congress. What kind of Cosatu do we want; what should be its policies; what role for workers in decision making in Cosatu and in society; what role should we be playing politically; how should we strengthen the Alliance; what are the alternatives to the government's current macro-economic policies? I do not know what the outcome will be. What I do know is that we can all rise to the challenge.
The commission has numerous proposals on building Cosatu, reclaiming redistribution, building the Alliance, the ANC in particular, organising the unorganised and the vulnerable etc. These issues have always been talked about, but with no action taken to deal with them. We have a responsibility to face up to these issues. In certain instances, our own positions, traditions and cultures will be challenged. This should be no reason to reject the recommendations. In fact, it should spur us to review our positions, traditions and culture to ensure a better Cosatu capable of influencing social transformation.
At the same time, we do not want change for its own sake. It has to help re-engineer the Federation, make all workers feel at home and have policies and implementation strategies which are viable, taking into account the changes political landscape.
The report focuses on analysing the current situation - politically, organisationally, internationally and economically; key challenges facing Cosatu, as well as the policy options available to us. We also report on activities undertaken since the last congress. These are important to ensure that leadership is accountable to the membership and the congress.
Last year, the Exco released a discussion document on the programme for the Alliance. To date we have not yet resolved what the content of the programme should be as well as the form - Reconstruction Accord or not. At the same time, there is raging debate about the role of Cosatu, its members and leadership in building the ANC. This is clouded by the fact that the ANC congress is also just around the corner. Should Cosatu leadership take up positions in the ANC or not? How do we answer the charge that we often refuse to serve in the ANC, but freely serve in all structures of the SACP. While I do not think of it as the truth, there are those who believe that maybe Cosatu has an attitude to the ANC.
It is more than a year since the release of GEAR. Has it helped improved our situation as workers? I doubt it. What is the way out of this issue which often bedevils our relationship as the Alliance. How do we create jobs, transform the public sector, bring about better conditions and legislation to workers and society, reduce inequities etc?
We have all seen the impact of the current macro-economic strategy in our day to day situation. Apart from rejecting it, what proposals are we placing on the table? How do we ensure their implementation - remember the Social Equity document? Our most important asset is Cosatu. How do we rebuild it into a fighting organ with worker participation at the centre. There are many issues that workers deal with at the workplace - productivity, training, racism etc. What is our capacity to assist them in dealing with these issues? The same goes for our locals and regions. Can they engage and influence political and development issues at their level?
The CEC in April resolved to affiliate to the ICFTU after three years of intense debate. Should congress ratify it, it should also develop strategies to influence the international scene rather than mere participation.
I am convinced that we can rise to the challenge. If we don't, history will judge us very harshly indeed .
- Mbhazima Shilowa
Delegates at Cosatu's sixth national congress face the challenge of developing strategies and policies that will strengthen Cosatu, the Alliance and the new democracy and make our quest for a better life a reality
The countdown to Cosatu's sixth national congress has begun. Much of the federation's vision on key political and socio-economic issues has been set out by affiliate resolutions and reports from the Cosatu secretariat and September Commission. But the congress faces the daunting challenge of setting out a path which will take the federation into the next millennium.
The sixth congress, held under the theme Defend, Consolidate and Advance Social Transformation, will be one of Cosatu's most important to date, says assistant general secretary Zwelinzima Vavi.
About 2 400 worker delegates are expected at the congress representing Cosatu affiliates' paid-up membership of around 1,8 million workers from all sectors of the economy.
The congress will look back at developments since Cosatu's fifth national congress, September 1993 special congress as well as four policy conferences and numerous Exco's and CEC's which developed and refined Cosatu's policies and campaigns.
Cosatu set up the September Commission to make proposals on the strategic choices facing Cosatu in pursuit of the country's transformation. Their recommendations will also be tabled at the congress for debate and resolution. (See pages 12-48 for summaries of the Commission's report and recommendations.) "At the conclusion of the 5th national congress, we felt ready to face the challenges of the transition," says Cosatu's secretariat report to the congress.
"We are called upon to consider whether we were able to live up to those challenges. Where we were not able to achieve our goals, we need to frankly analyse what went wrong.
"The previous congress adopted resolutions relating to building Cosatu, the Alliance, developing socio-economic policies which would bring an end to the misery caused by apartheid oppression and its exploitative economic policies and engaging in campaigns and negotiations to back the process of transformation.
"We are now half-way between the first and the second democratic elections. You are called upon to review the ensuing period as well develop strategies and policies that will strengthen Cosatu, the Alliance and our new democracy; prepare for a decisive victory in the next elections at all levels, particularly in Kwazulu Natal and the Western Cape, as well as adopt policies that will make our quest for a better life a reality." Delegates will be mindful of the fact that the 1999 general elections are not far away. And many affiliates have already resolved to support the ANC in the elections and to build the Tripartite Alliance.
Vavi says the congress is taking place at a time when the democratic movement in general and particularly the left is organisationally weak.
Unlike in the run-up to the 1994 elections, when Cosatu played a key role in drawing up the RDP as the ANC's election platform, today there is a sense that Cosatu's influence on macro-economic and socio-economic policy is on the decline.
As general secretary Mbhazima Shilowa put it, "In the pre-election period when we addressed congresses outlining Cosatu's vision, we spoke about the changes we wanted to see implemented in the new South Africa. Now that the future democratic dispensation we always talked about has arrived, we realise that the future isn't what it used to be!"
"The congress is happening at a crucial time when we are faced with the neo-liberal onslaught in the form of Gear adopted by government," says Vavi. "It is happening at a time when reactionary forces are regrouping and showing signs of attempts to derail the achievements we have scored in the transition.
"There is confusion among activists as to the role they should be playing and the strategic direction of the national democratic revolution in the transition." These and other challenges of social transformation will mean that the federation's vision and delegate's ideals are likely to be tempered with a heavy dose of realism.
"In some cases, what we lack is not policies, but an implementation strategy," says Shilowa. He urged congress to consider policies as well as an implementation strategy to ensure that Cosatu decisions are carried through by all its structures.
Top of the agenda on socio-economic policy will be job creation and meeting basic needs, says Vavi.
But there is a strong recognition that the congress will have to go far beyond simply stating a wish list. The central question is how to realise the federation's objectives and vision and how to effectively drive this process.
The need for an Alliance programme is a strong thrust in the September Commission recommendations and Cosatu's discussion document on an Alliance programme, released late last year, as well as in recent discussions within the Alliance.
Such a programme, says Vavi, is necessary to shift the balance of forces and to impact on socio-economic policy in a way that benefits not only union members and other workers, but improves the living standards of the poor generally.
Labour market policy has become a key battleground. Business has used this as a terrain to push their neo-liberal agenda, including pushing for deregulation and measures to maintain a cheap supply of labour. The congress will have to discuss how to resist this agenda, to consolidate gains made so far and to push for further labour market transformation.
The struggle over the Basic Conditions of Employment (BCE) Bill is likely to be uppermost in delegates' minds. With Cosatu's programme of mass action around the Bill behind them, the Bill is expected to be under discussion in parliament while the congress is in progress. The outcome of current discussions within the Alliance on the Bill will be fed into the congress, says Vavi.
Contrary to myths propagated by business, the congress will hear a report that the real wages of South African workers have actually declined over the past few years while productivity has increased by 4%.
Vavi says this points to the need to revitalise the living wage campaign as part of a collective bargaining strategy as well as to push for minimum wages for workers in vulnerable sectors.
Cosatu's demand for a 4% training levy and other labour demands in negotiations on the government's Skills Development Strategy are also likely to be discussed.
The congress could emerge with the most dramatic organisational restructuring since Cosatu was formed.
The key question is: should Cosatu continue to function as a relatively loose formation with a coordinating role or evolve into a tighter, more centralised body where policies are binding on affiliates? Should the federation play a central role, for example, in driving collective bargaining and industrial policy and have the authority to intervene where affiliates deviate from Cosatu policy?
Both the September Commission and Cosatu's policy conference in May this year brought this question to the fore. The September Commission recommends a reform of Cosatu structures and practices to strengthen the federation's engines and capacity. This would entail developing a closer working relationship between affiliates and the centre, with affiliates playing a greater role in directing the centre.
Tighter coordination would also enable the Cosatu to play a greater role in collective bargaining and in the living wage campaign.
"The congress gives us the opportunity to emerge with a federation that is not just a loose coordinating body, but one with the powers to intervene directly in political campaigns, building solidarity between affiliates and driving issues such as wage policy and collective bargaining priorities and timeframes," says Vavi.
The congress will also have to confront and resolve the vexed question of demarcation, which has at times led to inter-union conflict and poaching.
Proposals on demarcation have been circulated to unions for discussion and debate in the build-up to the congress.
"Congress will have to emerge with a clear demarcation policy. This should be binding on all affiliates," Vavi said.
Resolutions on women and gender have been on the agenda of every Cosatu congress. But the build-up to this year's congress has seen heightened militancy on the issue of women leadership in Cosatu and its affiliates and the issue is likely to spark lively debate.
"We can't just have a beautiful-sounding resolution again," says Vavi. "It is no longer enough to pay lip service to the need for the development of women in our structures. We need concrete steps to ensure implementation."
The September Commission has proposed a 50% quota system to ensure that women are represented in the structures of the federation and its affiliates.
The reality of South Africa's semi-federal constitution and three-tier system of government means that Cosatu will have to seriously reconsider the roles and capacity of its regional and local structures. Provincial and local government now have considerable power to set policies which impact directly on the lives of workers and their communities.
"The voice of Cosatu at a provincial and local level has not been heard strongly enough," says Vavi. "But we can't just say our regions and locals must play a role when they don't have the capacity to do this. Otherwise they will just be rubber-stamps. "We need to ensure that they make their mark in pushing for transformation at provincial and local level as spelt out in the RDP.
"We will have to look at how to restructure the locals and regions and their roles in a manner that is consistent with Cosatu's financial means and at the same time ensure that they can play a greater role in meeting the challenges they face."
A range of resolutions have been received from Cosatu affiliates, including Num, Sactwu, Saapawu, Cawu, CWIU, Ppwawu, Sarhwu, TGWU, Samwu, Numsa, Nehawu, Sadtu and Fawu. These have emerged from union congresses, policy conferences and other constitutional structures.
Key resolutions focus on socio-economic policy, political programme, the Tripartite Alliance and organisational restructuring of Cosatu. A congress resolutions committee is in the process of drawing up composite resolutions. These will be distributed, along with a range of other congress documents such as the Secretariat Report, for discussion prior to the congress.
While affiliates have made submissions and have been discussing and commenting on drafts of the September Commission report, the final report will be released on 18 August. Specific proposals in the report will be discussed jointly with the Secretariat Report.
Cosatu's Exco at the end of July agreed on a process for the election of the federation's National Office Bearers. IMMSA has been approached to handle the nominations and the election process and affiliates have been asked to submit their nominations not later than 31 August 1997. But the Exco pointed out that the significance of the congress will go way beyond the individuals who will lead the giant federation into the next millennium.
|
Union |
Paid-up membership |
Voting delegates |
| CAWU |
31 606 |
42 |
| CWIU |
45 000 |
60 |
| CWU |
40 000 |
53 |
| FAWU |
139 810 |
186 |
| IPS |
0 |
0 |
| NEHAWU |
162 530 |
217 |
| NUM |
310 596 |
414 |
| NUMSA |
220 000 |
293 |
| POPCRU |
44 999 |
60 |
| PPWAWU |
49 422 |
66 |
| SAAPAWU |
0 |
0 |
| SACCAWU |
102 234 |
136 |
| SACTWU |
150 000 |
200 |
| SADTU |
146 000 |
195 |
| SAMWU |
108 738 |
145 |
| SAPSA |
14 318 |
19 |
| SARHWU |
37 150 |
50 |
| SASBO |
70 377 |
94 |
| TGWU |
53 000 |
71 |
|
TOTAL |
1 725 780 |
2 301 |
Our political vision includes the following key elements:
The RDP would form the basis of the legislative and political programme of government for transformation. In addition to developing a broad political vision for transformation, we outlined a platform of issues which were a priority for Cosatu. Specific constitutional, policy and legislative measures were needed to entrench and advance rights and programmes of special concern to workers. This meant entrenching in the constitution as a framework of fundamental worker rights, within which legislation would fall.
We elaborated a vision of comprehensive legislative reform. This entailed consolidated labour legislation for workers in all sectors of the economy to set a minimum floor of rights (Basic Conditions of Employment Act); fundamental organisational rights within a framework of strong sectoral bargaining structures, which entrench the right of workers to strike, and extend the bargaining powers of unions into key areas of distributional, production and investment issues (the Labour Relations Act).
We developed an additional package of legislative measures designed to enable trade unions to drive a process of industrial restructuring. Apart from the LRA, these included the introduction of a new qualifications framework and measures for expanded training and access to all strategic information. Economic measures having a bearing on industrial restructuring, such as trade, tariff and industrial policy would be tabled for discussion in tripartite and industrial forums.
Our vision included other legislative and institutional reform, which would directly involve trade unions in transformation of the economy, such as:
Through the RDP, we envisaged a programme of extensive legislative and institutional reform in areas such as the public sector, health, housing, social security, public works, transport and land.
Significant gains have been made since 1994. A decisive majority for the ANC created the potential for a strong national government to actively implement the programme for transformation outlined in the RDP. Threats by elements in the security establishment and the ultra-right to destabilise the democratisation process through the use of violence has largely been contained. Their campaign of counter revolutionary violence waged before the elections has been warded off. The process of drafting a new constitution was successfully completed, with significant advances in some areas of socio-economic rights, worker rights, and deepening of democracy. Some areas of the constitution remain defective and these remain an area struggle.
Important policy and legislative breakthroughs were made, and some implemented, in areas such as health, labour, water, land, education and training.
At the same time, the Alliance has encountered serious difficulties in implementing the transformation agenda. The reasons for this are many and complex, relating to both internal and international factors, objective constraints as well as subjective errors in the way we have approached the transition.
While objective problems and constraints have been encountered in attempting to transform the state and implement our programme of transformation, the democratic movement has also failed to seize the initiative to effectively direct and drive the process of change. Elements of the apartheid era ruling class have used their power, which is still entrenched in the bureaucracy, media, and key centers of the economy, to shape the transition in their own image.
The Alliance has failed to develop a strategic approach to practically implement its programme in the concrete conditions of transition. What would be the relationship between the Alliance and government, the ruling party and the bureaucracy, the executive and the apartheid era public service, the democratic forces and the economy, the role of the progressive trade union movement in policy formulation? Who would drive the formulation of policy, and its implementation? This failure has resulted on the whole in the strategic initiative passing into the hands of those opposed to fundamental transformation.
A critical problem is the fact that policy formulation in areas such as the economy, housing, public service transformation, and others has been driven by technocrats (often from business), the bureaucracy and Ministries.
The ANC as the ruling party, and the Alliance, have had to deal with these policies as they emerge, rather than driving their development, and ensuring that we direct the transformation agenda.
The result is that we often have to react to policies which are directly opposed to the thrust of the platform outlined in the RDP. The introduction of Gear (the reverse Gear of our society) in June 1996, two months before it was discussed in ANC constitutional structures, followed by Maria Ramos and Trevor Manuel's pronouncement that the strategy is non-negotiable, is the most serious example of this problem. However, in this respect, Gear was not unusual. It followed the pattern of treating the Alliance with contempt on issues of governance and policy formulation by certain ministers.
Labour legislation has been a major Cosatu focus. Introduction of these legal reforms constitutes a major advance for workers and the labour movement. These key labour laws are:
These will represent a major advance away from apartheid legislation. We have also actively supported other important pieces of progressive legislation. These include legislation to make health care more accessible and reduce drug prices, legislation to extend telecommunications and the Termination of Pregnancy Bill. We have coupled our support of these Bills with proposed amendments to strengthen or improve them.
In some cases we have engaged with legislation where a key aspect of the Bill is problematic, without opposing the entire Bill. This required targeted interventions aimed at amending specific clauses. This approach was successfully achieved in submissions on the Small Business Bill, which resulted in the removal or amendment of provisions which could have been used to undermine labour standards.
A historic victory was scored with our submission on the Pensions Bill, which resulted in the mandatory (minimum) representation of workers on boards of funds being increased from the one third proposal in the Bill to one half, despite opposition from the industry, business in general and their representatives in parliament. An important condition for this success has been the preparation of legal wording of alternative clauses, put forward for adoption by the parliamentary committee.
We have opposed legislation which we believe is not in line with the policies advanced by Cosatu and RDP objectives. We registered our opposition to legislation which deprived the SABC of revenue from the sale of its radio stations. Our approach is that revenue generated through the restructuring of state assets should be reinvested into these public enterprises, to ensure a more effective public service.
In the case of legislation on tax holidays, we took the view that the proposal to exempt certain companies from paying tax (in terms of Gear) was problematic because it undermined the country's tax base, unfairly threatened businesses paying tax in the same sector, and entailed a further shift of the tax burden to working people. However, we made a tactical decision, while registering our opposition to the tax holidays Bill, to put forward proposals to limit its negative effects by submitting a number of amendments. Most of these were accepted and the Minister agreed to implement some in regulations.
At one point we had entertained the thought that, instead of confronting Gear head on, we would attempt to propose progressive policies in key areas of social and economic development, such as housing, and in that way hope to shift the parameters of Gear. The limitations of this approach, however, have become clear.
It is now apparent that we need to shift the parameters and orientation of the macroeconomic strategy itself, otherwise it will become increasingly difficult to make progress in advancing legislative processes aimed at transformation. This is not a position arrived at lightly, or based on some bravado to challenge government policies.
It is based on the concrete reality of Gear's impact on all areas of our life! Gear is intruding into a wide range of social policy and legislation. Gear's intermediate objectives of fiscal discipline have replaced the social and developmental aspects of the RDP. This has had a paralysing affect on policy and legislation aimed at transformation. The Finance and the Trade and Industry Ministries have both privately and publicly questioned the BCEA based on the "financial implications" as well as their "religious" commitment to Gear; the restrictive approach adopted in the Lund Commission and to Social Welfare more generally; and the approach to cutting back the public sector. What is clear is that all conservative elements of Gear are being implemented vigorously, while areas which on paper hold the prospect of transformation have been relegated to the back burner. We have it on good authority that these areas were not part of the Gear conceptualisation, but added as a sop to make it seem to be in line with the RDP!
While the Federation has particular power and leverage in its engagement with the political processes, this needs to be complemented with a co-ordinated strategy of engagement by affiliates. Participation by affiliates in legislation and policies affecting their sector has been uneven, ranging from fairly effective to little or no involvement. Affiliates which have been fairly active include NUM on the Mine Health and Safety Bill, TGWU on transport policy and legislation for the security industry; Nehawu on public service issues; Samwu on local government; and Sadtu on education. Public sector unions have been more active than the private sector, possibly because they are more exposed to processes of governance.
A number of affiliates have been discussing deploying permanent representatives to parliament to monitor legislation and policies. We are embarking on a programme to train interns from affiliates, to expose comrades to the legislative processes, and to assist in developing an affiliate strategy for their sector. This will deepen our engagement and strengthen our capacity. While encouraging affiliates to engage directly, we need to ensure that, on national policy issues such as restructuring the public sector, local government, or transport, Cosatu develops and pushes positions as a federation, rather than leave it solely to the relevant affiliate.
Whatever our position on federalism, the reality is that we now have a quasi-federal political system. This poses the question as to what role Cosatu regions should play on issues of provincial governance. Our regions have had limited interaction with provincial legislatures. They have tended to concentrate on Development Forums. There has also been some interaction on provincial budgets, as well as on Provincial Constitutions in Kwazulu Natal and the Western Cape. We should however recognise the fact that regions have no capacity, nor has the federation regarded provincial legislatures as a priority, given our views on the need to limit provincial powers.
The adoption of the new Constitution now forces us to address the reality that we ignore the role of the provinces at our own peril and that a careful process of engagement can result in positive results for workers.
The introduction of the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) means that provinces have a real say in national legislation, and in certain instances can effectively exercise a veto. Furthermore, the lion's share of the national budget is now allocated to provinces. This combination of factors makes it essential for us to influence provincial policies to be as worker friendly as possible.
However, our regions are already overstretched and have limited capacity. We are embarking on a national project of training regions in engaging with provincial legislatures. This will include assistance in setting up networks and tracking policy and legislation, both in the provinces and the NCOP. We are looking at setting up a national database, together with NGO's, to assist in tracking processes in various provinces. Regions are also being encouraged to establish forums with the ANC in the provincial legislatures, to ensure effective co-operation. Where our regions overlap with provincial boundaries, they need to develop mechanisms to ensure joint action.
A number of issues have not been resolved in the Constitution, or require follow up. We need to develop a strategy to take forward the labour, socio-economic and other rights in the Constitution, and to counter possible litigation by employers and other reactionary forces. We need to push for legislation required to implement the Constitution, including on access to information, procurement procedures and transparent budgeting procedures. Otherwise these gains will remain paper victories.
The Constitution contains interim provisions that provide only for the PR list. This means that national and provincial representatives are not directly accountable to constituencies. We need to campaign for the inclusion of the constituency electoral system after the next elections.
Our proposal for a Workers Charter to be adopted has been accommodated by S234 of the Constitution, which allows for parliament to adopt charters of rights in line with the Constitution. Congress needs to decide on how best to make this a reality. South Africa has a rich history of broad fronts, including coalitions spearheaded by Cosatu around specific issues such as VAT, and more recently against the banks' interest rates hike. The challenge now is to build these broad coalitions, under new conditions and in support of deepening democracy and transformation. This involves working with organisations in civil society which are not necessarily part of the democratic movement, but nevertheless support progressive demands on a particular issue or set of issues.
The transition have thrown up serious challenges for the Alliance, particularly in relation to issues of governance. Some of the issues include:
Given these factors, the challenge facing Cosatu is clearly to put forward workable proposals aimed at ensuring that the Alliance functions effectively and particularly in giving direction to governance and transformation; develop political strategies to deal with forces blocking transformation; and develop an alliance programme or agreement, to lead the transformation process.
If these strategies fail, the danger exists of a disintegration of the Alliance in the long term, with all its implications. While this scenario is not in the best interests of workers, we can not ignore it. We therefore need to focus our energies on putting in place concrete steps which will ensure that this does not materialise. Just as the Alliance is our only viable hope for transformation, a lame duck Alliance spells disaster for transformation and democracy. There are signs that some in the ANC leadership realise this danger and, together with us, are looking at a long-term solution to the problems of the Alliance.
The "Discussion Document on a Programme for the Alliance" adopted by the Exco proposes, among other things, that the Alliance reach an agreement on strategic areas needed to drive transformation. Such an agreement would lay the basis for an election platform in 1999. Congress needs to discuss the implications and desirability of such an agreement. More importantly, it needs to discuss the implications of failing to secure an agreement, and allowing the current situation of continuous tensions and lack of an agreed strategy to continue. Even if we decide against a comprehensive Alliance Programme, we need to adopt alternatives which will enable us to propel social transformation.
An effective Alliance programme depends on an effective, functioning and well co-ordinated Alliance. The loose structures of co-ordination of the pre-election period are now hopelessly inadequate to deal with the challenges of the transition and governance. The challenge of developing functioning alliance structures goes way beyond the issue of regular meetings. It requires the setting up of appropriate structures and co-ordinating mechanisms at all levels, which have the authority and resources to take the appropriate decisions. This requires
To be effective, the Alliance structures would need to address the following elements:
Cosatu itself would need to have mechanisms to ensure regular assessments on the functioning of the Alliance, including our role in this regard. It is clear that a functioning Alliance programme and effective structures are interdependent. One cannot work without the other. It is obvious that a programme cannot be implemented without effective structures. But what is perhaps less obvious, is that functioning alliance structures are hollow if they are not based on a programme. This becomes clear if we consider questions of governance. If Alliance structures have no meaningful say over policy and legislative issues, and no programme to drive it, these structures will become increasingly directionless and irrelevant.
We need to build on the rich traditions of the 1980Ős, which saw a wide variety of mass formations mobilised under one umbrella to achieve the common goal of ending apartheid tyranny and securing national liberation. Now, under new conditions, we need to harness this tradition to build a mass movement for transformation. Such a movement is essential to take forward programmes in areas such as public sector transformation, housing, health, literacy, rural development and others. It will also be critical in neutralising those forces attempting to block or derail the transformation process.
The alliance needs to discuss, together with other mass formations, the development of such a programme, as well as fora which would help to take this process forward, including the possibility of convening an MDM Summit on transformation.
When Cosatu decided to release leaders onto the ANC elections list for national and provincial legislatures, we had two main objectives:
The strategy to strengthen the ANC and to ensure an election victory appears to have paid off. It is however doubtful as to whether we are `getting value for our money' from these comrades. Obviously their effectiveness or otherwise can't be divorced from the issue of the functioning of the alliance.
`Former Cosatu' MP's are not homogeneous and Cosatu's support base in the legislatures extends beyond them. While some have maintained dynamic contact with the federation and support pro-worker positions, others have adopted right-wing positions. At the same time, many ANC MP's and MPL's who were never part of Cosatu have actively supported our positions. We must therefore avoid adopting a narrow approach in addressing this question. In deciding on participation of worker leaders in the 1999 elections, various factors should be taken into account:
A similar assessment needs to done of comrades working in local government.
Nedlac is our creation. It was born out of our struggle to involve workers in the formulation of policies which directly affect them, particularly on labour and socio-economic issues. Its character obviously means that it contains many contradictions, and is a terrain of struggle. Nevertheless it is an institution which we defend, since it constitutes a deepening of democracy, and a recognition of the central role of organised labour in the economy.
The role of Nedlac in issues of governance has itself become a site of struggle. The Act provides that Nedlac must 'consider all proposed labour legislation... (and) all significant changes to social and economic policy before its is implemented or introduced in Parliament'. This far-reaching provision has been treated in a fairly flexible way by the parties to Nedlac, rather than insisting on its mechanical implementation. Despite this, a lobby in government has been pushing for Nedlac's powers to be reduced, on the basis that it 'undermines the sovereignty of parliament'. In most instances this lobby is backed by those who undermine the role of the Alliance in policy formulation. What they want is a blank cheque to formulate policy without Alliance participation. This would be tantamount to confining the masses to being mere spectators in the theatre of transformation and policy formulation.
Employers have adopted an expedient and unprincipled approach to Nedlac. They are only participating in it because they are afraid of the Alliance's potential to push transformation through parliament. Some seem to be shying away from this, particularly our friends in government who see the government as a neutral force mediating between competing interest in the so-called golden triangle. Where the government adopts policies which they approve of, they are happy for Nedlac to be sidelined. Where the government introduces transformatory legislation or policy, they want to use Nedlac to block progress.
Our view is that Nedlac should not be counterposed to parliamentary democracy, but should be seen in the context of the need to enrich and deepen that democracy. It is therefore an institution which we should defend. At the same time, we must not lock ourselves into Nedlac, but adopt flexible strategies depending on the issue. The NFA on the restructuring of state assets was a bilateral matter to be settled between labour and government. In the BCEA negotiations, we have clearly indicated that negotiations in Nedlac are not endless. Nor are they a substitute for the responsibility of parliament to legislate. While we will endeavour to reach agreement, we should not allow business to use Nedlac to block progress.
The Alliance needs to agree on an approach on these matters, which will guide both ourselves and government in Nedlac. Continued inconsistency will put Nedlac and the Alliance under increasing strain. The recent contradictory positions of government and the ANC on the BCEA, after having put across the message that `Nedlac shouldn't prevent the government from governing', was to effectively give business a veto, by saying that if no agreement was reached at Nedlac, the Bill would be withdrawn. This position is untenable and should be rejected by all of us.
We have taken the position that parliament is sovereign and that it retains the right to amend or reject any proposal put before it. However, parliament put Nedlac in place for a particular purpose, and therefore it would not make sense for it to easily unravel agreements made at Nedlac. If it did feel the need to make changes to any aspect of an agreement, obviously it would need to consider very seriously the implications of such a decision. Whether or not they go ahead and make changes is their prerogative. At the same time, there may be a number of areas where Nedlac could not reach agreement, which would require parliament to exercise its authority.
There is a need for a more dynamic and interactive relationship between Nedlac Chambers and parliamentary committees. Parliamentary committees should have direct structured and open access to Nedlac discussions as observers since it would compromise their independent role to make them part of the government delegation. Since they may not be able to attend Nedlac meetings, a more active process of briefing them is also needed.
The view that Nedlac negotiations quarantine an issue from being discussed in parliament seems to be taking hold. We need to check whether the phrasing of the Act prevents parliament from beginning discussions on an issue under discussion in Nedlac. In our view, it would enrich the process, for example, for a parliamentary committee to hold hearings while negotiations were taking place in Nedlac.
This would ensure that, by the time Nedlac processed its agreement or deadlocked, the Committee would be well placed to take the issue forward. Obviously, the Committee would have to consider the nature of the issue, whether there was a draft Bill or policy paper, and other factors, including the state of negotiations, before deciding to go this route.
Phambili no mzabalazo wa basebenzi!
Phambili ne Socialism!
Phambili ne RDP!
Phansi ne GEAR!
Phambili ne ANC!
Phambili ne SACP!
Phambili ne COSATU!
Phambili ne Cuba!
Phambili ne Alliance!
Phambili no ku vhotela I ANC ngo 1999!
THE SEPTEMBER COMMISSION REPORT: A SUMMARY
1. DEMOCRACY AND ALLIANCES
Throughout the 1980s we defined our struggle as a struggle for national liberation, for democracy and for socialism. We now have a new constitution and our country is governed by the first democratically elected parliament and executive in its history. Democratic provincial and local governments have been elected and forums set up which institutionalise the participation of sections of civil society in political decision-making.
The transition to a fully democratic, united, non-racial and non-sexist society is still contested by a range of forces. The new government is limited to controlling areas of governance and is up against a minority bloc that is trying to use its overwhelming economic power to `abort' the National Democratic Revolution (NDR).
The main force for the completion of the NDR is a popular bloc of mainly black urban and rural working-class people (workers, the unemployed, the poor), the black middle-class (small business, professionals), and other groups of people who experience forms of oppression and exploitation, such as women, the youth, those employed in the informal sector and those who have allied themselves with the progressive movement such as revolutionary and progressive intellectuals and students. The main political expression of these sections of society is the ANC.
The main contending force against this popular bloc is the traditional white bourgeoisie, the mainly white middle-classes, and those elements who led and/or collaborated with the old regime. The possibility exists for this minority bloc to aggressively seek to make itself appear non-racial through promoting some black entrepreneurs and managers into the commanding heights of the economy. It also seeks to pressurise the ANC to adopt conservative policies that will limit transformation, and to further weaken the ANC.
The working class stands to lose the most if the ANC is diverted from the NDR's objectives. The decline of progressive organisations points towards the disintegration of our communities and the potential for increased conflict in society. The weakening of the MDM, the shift away from grassroots activity in the NLM, the widening gap between the ANC and its leaders in government, and Cosatu's reduced influence in the Alliance all suggest a danger of shifts in the NDR which the working class needs to be aware of and to counter.
The ANC is the largest political organisation in the country. It has a tradition and track record unequaled in the struggle against apartheid. Because the ANC is a multi-class organisation it can come under different influences. Its main constituency in terms of numbers is the working-class, who make up its key activists and leaders. The transition is increasing the size and influence of the black middle class. At the same time, the ANC is coming under pressure from international and domestic capital.
It is therefore necessary to build the ANC through strong, effective working-class leadership and with a working-class bias. This means having a coherent working-class presence within the ANC.
The SACP has an important role to play in asserting a socialist vision and programme and in developing working-class leadership and consciousness, both in the Alliance and more generally in society. There is poor cooperation and few joint activities between Cosatu and the SACP, despite the fact that we share a socialist vision and the working class as a constituency.
Cosatu must ensure it builds the SACP and assists in clarifying the Party's role. The Party and Cosatu must meet to jointly strategise around:
A complex relationship between the ANC, Cosatu and the SACP exists in various forms at various levels. It is a relationship shaped by deep historical linkages and common struggles. But it is not without its tensions and contradictions. The role of the ANC as government has added to the natural class and organisational tensions within the ANC and between the ANC, Cosatu and the SACP.
Revitalising the Tripartite Alliance is central to the success of the NDR. The Alliance is the engine for fundamental transformation. The aggressive forces of neo-liberalism exist, but that does not mean there is no space to develop and implement progressive social and economic policies.
The Alliance partners need to engage in a fundamental review, as a collective, of their relationship, roles, responsibilities and interests. A broad programme should be developed for the political arena, the economy, of social policy and the transformation of the state and public sector.
The MDM was the organised expression of the popular bloc led by the ANC during the 1980s. These mass organisations have declined. The change in political conditions is the main reason for the MDM's decline. Despite this, many formations are still organised and capable of mobilising.
Cosatu must build broad alliances around issues to win advances for the working class and other sections of society. New forms of organising will have to be found to address the changing conditions.
Cosatu should seek to build alliances around two central themes: overcoming poverty and inequality, and strengthening democracy.
A campaign against poverty and inequality could be organised by civil society. Such a campaign could be an important catalyst for transformation. This would not be a campaign against government but against the ravages of apartheid and against global and monopoly capital.
Our political vision is to consolidate and strengthen democracy, extend and deepen democracy to all levels and spheres of society, strengthen the working class and its organisations, ensure that working class perspectives are dominant at all levels of society, and to build a society based on a culture of community and solidarity. In short, it is to lay the basis for socialism.
Democracy is central to improving the lives and interests of the working class. Through democracy, the masses can participate in political life and shape our new society. The immediate challenge is to ensure that our new democratic institutions are working.
Economic democracy, the redistribution of wealth, incomes, services, skills, opportunities and the power in our country, its economic resources, is central to overcoming the legacy of apartheid and to driving development in South Africa. Social and economic justice is as relevant for democracy as the vote. Citizens have the right to housing, clean water, food, social security etc.
The NDR's success depends entirely on the extent to which the working class can lead the popular bloc in general and the ANC in particular. Transformation will be impeded or defeated unless working class leadership is a reality. Building working class leadership means:
Taken together, our political and economic vision is a programme for transformation. The state is both a major site of struggle and a key engine for transformation. Our programme for transformation relies on a strong, democratic state acting as an agent for transformation, for democratisation, redistribution and development. The developmental state must shift the balance of class forces, internationally towards national development rather than global profiteering and nationally towards the working class and the poor.
The new South Africa is a fragile, unstable, and rapidly changing society with a limited culture of national cohesion. Political warlords, criminals and gangsters, the Third Force and even a continuing culture of corruption threaten to undermine our democracy. Racism, ethnicity, crude power struggles and political careerism are all ways of mobilising forces against the NDR. Elements of the old elite seek to retain power and privilege through instability.
Against this stands a culture and tradition of solidarity, sacrifice and community that are at the heart of the democratic movement and the unions.
Though the regime tried to crush these during the 1970s and 1980s, these were the resources with which the new nation was forged. A culture of entitlement, self-enrichment and careerism is gaining ground in the NLM as a whole. This threatens not only to weaken organisations but the very fabric of our new society.
A peaceful society is only possible where there is stability. The struggle to deepen democracy in all aspects of our lives is central to our vision of socialism. The objective of socialism is to ensure that the material needs of citizens are met and that all have the opportunity to fulfill their potential.
This programme seeks to:
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Under apartheid, the South African economy developed structures which ensured a grossly unequal distribution of economic resources, distorted industrial development, widespread poverty, low living standards for the majority of South Africans, an inefficient public service with a racially skewed pattern of delivery, and an extremely segmented labour market.
The structural problems of the economy are severe and, in many cases, remain firmly in place. The transformation of South Africa's economy to meet the needs of all must be seen as a structural transformation, not simply a problem of deregulating markets, making way for the private sector and stabilising the rate of inflation and the rand.
In the new South Africa the centres of economic power remain relatively unchanged. Vast conglomerates continue to control most productive investment and financial activities. Land distribution remains as racially skewed as it was under apartheid. The Reserve Bank remains unaccountable and continues to exert enormous influence - even retarding economic growth and development - through its restrictive monetary policies.
The sole major economic instrument in the hands of the progressive movement is the state. However our victory here is by no means assured. Large segments of the state machinery are still controlled by bureaucrats from the old order who are either unwilling or unable to develop and implement policies to meet the needs of the people. At the same time, important aspects of government economic policy seem designed to downplay or undermine the state as a powerful instrument for transforming our economy and meeting the needs of the people.
The core of the ANC government's economic strategies is laid out in the Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy (Gear). Gear has a range of elements. Gear's less negative aspects are:
These elements are however overwhelmed by Gear's overwhelming conservative aspects:
The result is that government economic policy's main aim is to meet the demands of financial capital and financial markets for conservative macro-economic targets. Social development targets set out in the RDP - job creation, services, public sector investment, investment in human resources - have become secondary. The intermediate objective of fiscal discipline has now substituted the ultimate objective of development.
These economic policies will likely lead to strengthening vested economic powers which have their roots in the apartheid era. They promise to strengthen capital, specifically its financial interests, and weaken labour. They promise very little redistribution of wealth and economic power. The stark contrast between the blatant wealth of a minority and the desperate poverty of the majority will continue to tear apart the fabric of society, generating crime and social instability. This is hardly going to improve investor confidence!
If we are right, and Gear fails to deliver rapid economic growth and job creation, one of two courses of action will be open to government. The first would be to abandon Gear and adopt more developmental strategies. The second would be to conclude that the medicine was not strong enough and thereby develop even harsher policies.
We believe that the aim of economic development should be to overcome poverty. This means reclaiming redistribution as the fundamental goal of economic policy, and as an instrument for generating economic growth. Redistributive policies should focus on three goals: increased productive activity, meeting the needs of all our citizens and economic democracy.
We see the state as a key economic agent. It is the biggest employer, consumer and investor. Through its fiscal and monetary policies, and the composition of its budget, it exerts a tremendous influence on the economy. Its parastatals - especially Eskom, Transnet, Telkom and the Post Office - are massive engines in the economy. Through its education, trade, procurement and industrial policies, it shapes the country's industrial development. An active, interventionist state is necessary to achieve our goal of economic development, to overcome poverty and redistribute power, wealth, incomes and economic opportunity from a small minority to the majority of citizens. This is what we mean by transforming the apartheid state into a developmental state.
The evidence is that:
The extreme contrast of wealth and poverty in South Africa make redistribution a necessary condition for economic growth. A trade union strategy for state-directed redistribution is also a strategy for economic growth.
We believe that the programme we suggest has a socialist orientation because it:
Socialism is often defined in terms of structures of ownership. Our programme envisages an economy composed of the public service, a state sector, a social sector and a co-operative sector, and the transformation of the private sector into a stakeholder sector. We are therefore proposing a significant basis of public and social ownership in the economy, as distinct from private ownership. Our proposal for a stakeholder sector entails a partial socialisation of capital. These proposals create foundations for potential socialist transformations in the future.
Government should avoid binding itself to specific financial deficit targets without first assessing their impact on: service delivery, the state's ability to extend services to communities previously denied to them and the state's institutional capacity. If deficit targets must be met, this should be done through increased taxation on the wealthy, rather than cutting - or failing to extend - social services to the poor. Government debt could also be substantially reduced by moving to a pay-as-you go public service pension fund. The budget process in South Africa must be reformed to allow greater transparency and democratic participation of labour and civil society.
Interest rates should be substantially reduced to create the scope for increased economic activity. The Reserve Bank should be restructured to ensure greater policy co-ordination between monetary policy and the country's developmental goals. Interest rates should stimulate growth and development rather than stifle or choke it.
The state needs to expand its provision of basic services to reach those previously excluded. Expenditure on clinics, hospitals, schools, child maintenance and old age care, cannot be seen simply as a cost in the form of consumption expenditure. It is an investment in people and community solidarity, which will contribute to a more productive society. We envisage a powerful role for the union movement in reshaping the public service and introducing dynamism into it. We propose a partnership between government and labour in transforming the public service, particularly with Cosatu affiliates who are committed to transformation as opposed to those unions who served apartheid religiously.
We advocate an industrial development strategy that is targeted, active and co-ordinated. Industrial development in South Africa should have the following goals:
In addition, industrial policy must be based on the following principles:
An active, targeted industrial strategy requires co-ordination. The establishment of a `pilot agency' has been suggested in the form of a 'ministry of the economy' or an agency in the president's office, to take charge of policy co-ordination and implementation.
Industrial companies are potentially major national assets in the quest for industrial development. They consist of large resources of capital, technology, expertise in product development and in competing for markets. As labour, we have tended to concentrate on advocating punitive policies in relation to business - for example, increased taxes and anti-trust legislation. There are good reasons for this, as business has tended to adopt an antagonistic attitude to many of our proactive proposals. There are, however, important examples of unions and business building partnerships around industrial strategy in particular sectors. We, assisted by an active industrial policy from the side of government, need to build on this experience.
Industrial partnerships need to focus on strategies for developing targeted sectors by mobilising capital, deciding on appropriate trade policies, bringing in international investors as partners, targeting markets, ensuring that appropriate technical, scientific, shopfloor and managerial skills are developed, and providing resources for R&D and technology development.
We see three focuses as central to efforts to increase investment:
Reserve Bank policies should encourage cheaper credit for targeted sectors. A restructured IDC and DBSA, as well as the NOSA, Land Bank and National Productivity Institute, are critically important institutions for leading industrial development. Their boards of control should include labour representation. In particular the funds of the IDC and DBSA should be substantially increased, as should their ability to extend cheap financing to targeted sectors and infrastructure.
Government needs to use public investment, infrastructural development and state contracts to expand the capacity of industry. Expanding domestic consumer markets so that domestic producers benefit from economies of scale is also important, and our general redistributive policies are designed to achieve this.
Currently, government tariff policy seems to be exclusively focused on increasing competitive pressures on domestic companies. This should be replaced with a `managed trade' policy which uses tariffs to strengthen and boost South African industry's ability to replace imports and as well as its ability to compete on international markets. This means protecting infant industries, especially sectors targeted for growth. The lessons from the rapidly growing economies of East Asia are clear. An import-substitution strategy with trade restrictions and a rapid development of export markets can be pursued at the same time.
Provinces and cities are becoming increasingly important sites of economic development. Provincial and municipal budgets and public services are concrete instruments for redistribution and development. A number of provinces have established development forums and many towns have local development forums. Government's SDIs are designed to unlock development potential in specific regions. It is important for labour to engage with regional and local development issues to protect their members as workers and as citizens, and to prevent a competitive `race to the bottom' between provinces.
The state already owns very big and important industrial enterprises in the form of parastatals like Eskom, Telkom and Transnet. In addition, through the IDC it has a large stake in a wide range of manufacturing enterprises. We propose a programme for transforming the state sector into a socialised sector. Enterprises in this sector are already owned by the state, and were established to produce for the public good (either to deliver cheap services or boost industrial development) rather than for profit. The parastatals should become laboratories for workplace and enterprise democracy, with union and worker participation in management boards. Unions could become much more actively involved in issues of service delivery, expansion and quality, and industrial development.
The state sector should also be expanded through the establishment of new institutions such as a housing parastatal. The aim of such a parastatal would be to build rental housing for households unable to afford ownership, and to facilitate the development of community-based housing co-operatives so communities can build their own low-cost houses.
A socially owned sector - where enterprises and capital are collectively owned, or partially owned, by organisations in civil society such as trade union or community trusts. The biggest institutions of social ownership are retirement funds. Worth some R500 billion, a large part of their assets consists of workers' deferred wages in the form of savings for retirement. Retirement funds represent 35% or more of total savings in South Africa, and provide about 60% of local finance to companies. The retirement funds are a major source of investment capital in the South African economy, and own substantial stakes in hundreds of companies. Although the retirement funds represent workers' money, workers have very little influence over how it is used. We have three proposals on how this can be changed.
The goal of building up a social sector would be:
Trade unions could actively promote the formation of worker co-operatives, as an alternative form of `black economic empowerment'. The Mineworkers Development Agency, formed by the NUM, has pioneered a development strategy based on the co-operative provision of economic services - transport, storage, bulk supplies, joint marketing and product development - to networks of self-employed former mineworkers. This provides the support base necessary for rural economic activity, boosting production, consumption, incomes and rural accumulation. We believe there is scope for the development of a dynamic co-operative movement, building on the above activities, as a far more meaningful form of grassroots economic empowerment than buying shares in Johnnic.
If a social sector as envisaged here is to flourish and expand, a number of support measures and institutions would have to come into being:
The legacy of the apartheid era has produced a set of labour market institutions which do not protect the welfare of the people.The two most severe problems are:
The connection between the structure of the labour market and the level of poverty in South Africa is a key area of concern. How can the labour market be restructured so as to become a central tool for eliminating poverty and moving towards a more equitable distribution of income in the country? Two answers have been given to this question:
Poverty is in fact a combination of these two extremes - the unemployed poor and the working poor. From the available data, both low wages and unemployment contribute to poverty in South Africa. Policies aimed at reforming the labour market and creating new job opportunities must take this dual source of poverty into account. Jobs must be created and economic opportunities expanded, but not at the expense of lower wages.
Wage flexibility as a means of poverty alleviation - and particularly if new jobs are seen as the central mechanism of redistribution - simply means exchanging one source of poverty (low wages) for another (unemployment). Creating new employment opportunities along with higher wages requires a long-run strategy and depends on the successful accumulation of productive investment in sectors of the economy which produce jobs, and on the structural transformation of the apartheid-era labour market.
Collective bargaining is a form of redistribution. For trade unions it is often the most important form of redistribution as it involves direct delivery to their members. Collective bargaining was used in an extremely effective manner by Cosatu affiliates during the 1980s and early 1990s. Cosatu succeeded not only in increasing its members' real wages, but in winning a range of benefits to compensate for the apartheid state's refusal to extend the social wage to those not classified as white.
Now, however, we are confronted with arguments that workers' wage gains should be limited or rolled back. It is argued that:
There is little evidence to support any of these arguments. A defining characteristic of incomes in South Africa is the wage gap between blue-collar and low-paid workers on the one hand and management and high-paid employees on the other. The gap between the salaries of management and other high-paid staff, and the wages of the bulk of union members, is among the highest in the world.
This is the legacy of the apartheid wage structure. Labour costs include the total wage bill, including the remuneration of management. White employees - who dominate managerial, professional, supervisory and skilled positions - account for some 45% of the wage bill, although they constitute only 23% of the total workforce in manufacturing. Supporting evidence for the high cost of management in South Africa is provided by the World Competitiveness Report. South Africa is ranked 41 out of 49 countries in terms of management efficiency, but 6 in terms of the remuneration of top management.
This points to the need to change the production system. Unproductive and idle managers who earn high salaries should be weeded out. Management functions should be devolved to the shopfloor, and a portion of management salaries that are saved should be redistributed to shopfloor workers. Likewise, there is no evidence that wage increases won by our members are the main source of inflation. To the extent that rising incomes generate inflationary pressure, this can more plausibly be explained by high and rising management incomes, a greater portion of which is spent on imported goods. Redistributing part of these incomes to workers will tend to increase demand for local goods, and reduce poverty. The proposals of the Cosatu Policy Conference on Closing the Wage Gap need to be taken forward, for a comprehensive programme, through national and sectoral bargaining, and employment equity legislation, to reduce the ratio between highest and lowest earners to 8:1, over a specified timeframe.
Strong union presence, worker rights and labour standards compel management to seek productivity improvement through increasing management effectiveness, innovation, increased investment in training and skills and worker participation. Management, and government - through the supply of services, infrastructure and industrial policy - bear a great responsibility for improving productivity. This does not mean that unions and their members have no contribution to make to improved performance. They are able to commit themselves to making their workplaces productive where they are accorded proper stakeholder rights, full information disclosure and a share in the benefits. The results in such workplaces will be improved work practices and relationships, and increased efficiency and productivity.
Union wage policies should be based on the following:
An economic strategy for South Africa must consider the development of southern Africa as a region. It will be impossible for the South African economy to grow if it is surrounded by a sea of poverty and unstable societies. Southern Africa has large potential markets of over 140 million people. Therefore a co-ordinated approach to regional development could allow Southern Africa to play a dynamic role in South-South economic relations, with important links to South America Asia, and the rest of Africa.
While it is possible to envision a co-ordinated regional development strategy in which all southern African countries benefit, there is a large risk of these countries adopting an approach to economic policy in which one country's gain is seen as another country's loss. Policy manoeuvres such as tax breaks, supply-side incentives, and flexible labour markets could be implemented as an attempt to attract foreign investment and remain competitive in world markets. The result would be an uncoordinated race to the bottom with each country trying to obtain a competitive edge. South Africa is the only country in the region with the resources to pull the region into a different growth path. The aim would be to develop regional programs for infrastructure development and industrial policy in the region without falling into this competitive trap.
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Transition has opened up great potential for us to intervene, drive and shape transformation.
For our political programme to extend democracy and our economic programme for reclaiming redistribution to work, Cosatu will have to engage vigorously within the Alliance, with government, parliament, and employers, at Nedlac and at industry and enterprise levels.
Cosatu also needs to engage in transforming the public sector, win stakeholder rights in the private sector and establish and expand the social and cooperative sectors. Provinces and towns are becoming increasingly important in formulating and implementing economic development policies.
Collective bargaining will come under increasing pressure from `globalisation'. It is important that the state actively redistributes wealth and consistently improves the social wage.
Some of Cosatu's goals should be:
Powerful affiliates are important for engaging at an industrial level in collective bargaining and sectoral industrial policy issues, for organising and servicing workers, and for building workplace organisation to engage employers. But we need to strengthen Cosatu's capacity to coordinate affiliates' industrial policy and collective bargaining activities.
Cosatu coordination is important because:
Cosatu coordination is important because:
Coordination is also necessary at the workplace level. This could focus on solidarity struggles, and joint recruiting campaigns for vulnerable sectors. Affiliates also need to share strategies for responding to company restructuring and democratisation in the private and public sectors.
To implement our programmes we need a national trade union centre with:
Our programme is extremely ambitious. It is impossible to engage with so many forces, institutions and forums, on so many policy issues, with our current capacity. Over the past three years, we have responded effectively to government and employer initiatives via these forums. But we have been ineffective in putting forward our own programmes for transformation.
The essence of Cosatu's capacity problem is the lack of strong, dynamic, working structures that can act as an engine to drive the programme of the federation.
Exco decides how to implement policy and monitors this implementation. But it does not actually implement or coordinate itself. This means Cosatu is driven by its secretariat of two.
LO Norway, on the other hand, has an NOB structure and Exco which are strong working structures. They strategise, make decisions, implement and coordinate.
LO Norway has a high level of interaction between affiliates and the centre, and joint implementation. But in Cosatu, the link between the centre and affiliates is quite weak. Affiliates meet in Exco and the CEC to determine Cosatu policies and strategies. Affiliates do not generally take part in implementing decisions. Exco does not meet often, so affiliates are not exposed to the constant pressure on the NOBs to develop new tactics and responses to rapidly changing conditions. The result is poor coordination of, and communication with, the affiliates.
These weaknesses, together with weaknesses within the affiliates, mean that the information flow from Cosatu via affiliates to members is inadequate. Members complain that the NOBs are negotiating without a mandate because they are not informed about negotiations and campaigns, or about Exco decisions.
Cosatu's lack of capacity and the weak link between affiliates and centre makes it unable to support weak affiliates or help with internal problems. It is extremely difficult for the federation to intervene in disputes between affiliates or where affiliates deviate from Cosatu policy.
These problems weaken the federation and its ability to implement programmes as a united force. Each affiliate depends not only on its own strength, but on the strength of the trade union movement as a whole. Deregulation, `labour market flexibility' and attempts to roll back unions start where the movement is weak.
Cosatu regional structures lack the resources to engage effectively with provincial governments and regional development forums. Yet these are increasingly important arenas for public service delivery and economic and industrial development. Regional structures are weak because they also lack powerful engines, and they do not receive adequate support from the national level. Many affiliate regional structures fail to attend Cosatu regional meetings or implement REC decisions. Cosatu ROBs feel they need more authority in dealing with affiliate regions and in Cosatu national structures.
Locals used to be real centres of innovation and activism in our movement. In the early 1980s the locals organised new factories, trained new shopstewards etc. In the middle and late 1980s the locals became political centres, building local alliances, driving local struggles and campaigns, mobilising solidarity and implementing national campaigns.
But as unions - and political struggles - became more centralised, the locals degenerated into administrative centres. Their agendas are packed with complex documents from head office. Locals are now very weak and often do not function outside major Cosatu campaigns.
Local office bearers complain of poor attendance at local meetings, and argued that their weak constitutional status, their lack of powers to discipline affiliates, and their lack of resources make it impossible to rebuild the locals or develop an active programme.
Cosatu has four options to deal with these problems and build a strong national centre:
Continuing as we are means Cosatu would have to abandon its aim of being a proactive movement for transformation and narrow its focus to defending workers' interests and collective bargaining. The federation would become looser. Strong affiliates would continue to do well, and weaker affiliates would stagnate or disappear. The Alliance would get weaker, and Cosatu would adopt ad hoc or defensive positions.
Cosatu could reform its structures and practices to strengthen the capacity and engines of the federation, and develop a closer working relationship between affiliates and the centre, without radically changing the constitutional relationship between federation and affiliates. This option would go a long way to overcoming the weaknesses and problems we have identified above, and give the federation the capacity to be proactive.
The radical option would transform the federation into a single organisation with industrial arms. There would be a single constitution for the whole organisation. The industrial arms would not be separate unions, but be called Cosatu-mining or Cosatu-metal, for example. Collective bargaining and industrial action would be directly coordinated by Cosatu. Collective bargaining would be highly centralised. A unitary structure would eliminate tension amongst affiliates, and between affiliates and centre. The centre would have powers to support, discipline, intervene in or override the industrial arms.
Cosatu could opt for a mix between a federation and a unitary organisation. This would mean adopting more unitary elements in its structures to complement its current federal structure. For example, locals and regions could be given a stronger constitutional status.
National industrial unions are the "voice" of representation in Cosatu. Issues and mandates are filtered through affiliates' national structures before being voiced in the CEC or congress. This filters out issues facing the federation (as distinct from affiliates) at regional and local levels. This may exclude many grassroots issues facing by workers in communities and provinces.
In this option, the local and regional voice could be institutionalised in the major policy-making structures of the federation. For example, regions could have 10% of the representation and vote at national congress and in the CEC; locals could have 15% in both structures. Likewise, regional congresses could ensure 20% of their representation comes from locals.
In this option, the centre would have a stronger identity of its own, and more power than the affiliates, but the affiliates would still have their own independent powers.
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